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COMMENTARY
German Council on Foreign Relations
France and Germany 
Need a Dialogue on 
Nuclear Policy
No More Talking Past Each Other
In February 2020, it was Emmanuel 
Macron’s turn to make the traditional 
speech given by French presidents on 
military and nuclear doctrine. Many 
observers hailed Macron’s address as 
a real breakthrough, oﬀ ering European 
partners a strategic dialogue on security, 
defense, and nuclear policy. Yet com-
pared to French positions voiced in the 
past, this year’s were not a real step for-
ward. To achieve momentum in Europe, a 
dialogue is ﬁ rst needed within Germany 
before it can start one with France.
On February 7, 2020, French President 
Emmanuel Macron gave a speech on 
France’s policy of nuclear deterrence. 
It was complemented by an exten-
sive interview at the Munich Security 
Conference on February 15, in which 
Macron made a strong case for pursu-
ing a strategic dialogue with European 
partners – one that includes a discus-
sion of the role of nuclear deterrence 
alongside conventional security and 
defense policy. His purpose was two-
fold. On the one hand, France aims to 
strengthen Europe’s strategic autono-
my in a context in which the US is in-
creasingly perceived as an unreliable 
and unpredictable ally. On the other, 
it wants to engage with Germany on 
security and defense issues rather 
than merely focusing on areas in which 
France is perceived to be on the re-
ceiving end of Germany’s largesse, 
such as those related to the euro area 
or European industrial policy.
Macron’s speech took place in a very 
different geostrategic and nuclear 
context from those of years past. First, 
concern about proliferation is grow-
ing in the face of the failure of the Iran 
nuclear deal formally known as the 
Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action 
(JCPOA) and North Korea’s return to 
nuclear testing and armament, as well 
as the denunciation by the United 
States of the 1987 Intermediate Range 
Treaty and its threat not to renew 
its commitment to the START treaty, 
which expires in 2021. Second, nuclear 
technology has surged in both the US 
and Russia, resulting in supersonic 
vehicles for nuclear weapons, trans-
continental torpedoes, and weap-
ons equipped with radioactive and 
nuclear components that blur the lines 
between chemical and conventional 
warfare – all of which increase the nu-
clear threat. Finally, while geostrate-
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gic instability and risks grow, popular 
pressure for the abolition of nuclear 
weapons has been building interna-
tionally, particularly since the adop-
tion of the Treaty on the Prohibition of 
Nuclear Weapons (TPNW) in Septem-
ber 2017 by 80 countries, two of which 
– Ireland and Austria – are European.
Given the changing nature of nucle-
ar and geopolitical threats and uncer-
tainty around existing alliances and US 
engagement, France’s doctrine of nu-
clear deterrence has evolved consid-
erably over the years (see table be-
low). In principal, it remains defensive. 
Yet while the doctrine was initially de-
veloped only to respond to threats of 
a nuclear nature, it has now been el-
evated into the continuum of France’s 
conventional military forces. The ini-
tial general threat to inflict “inaccept-
able damage” and destruction on a 
territory and its population has grad-
ually become a more strategic threat 
to target economic and political hubs. 
Moreover, France’s definition of its vi-
tal interests is evolving to encompass 
a European dimension and to include 
the safeguarding of its population in 
addition to defending its territory.
France continues to view nuclear de-
terrence as an essential aspect of its 
and Europe’s sovereignty. In fact, the 
current French government sees the 
retrenchment of the US that began in 
the aftermath of the Iraq War and was 
made more visible under the adminis-
tration of President Donald Trump as a 
profound vindication of France’s arm’s-
length relationship to NATO and its in-
dependent nuclear strategy. Macron 
continues to insist that Europe’s secu-
rity must be built on two pillars: on the 
one hand, NATO and, on the other, Eu-
rope’s own defense capacity, the latter 
of which requires both common de-
fense capacity and nuclear deterrence. 
Given this belief, France has intro-
duced new multiyear military budget-
ary planning, which includes spending 
37 billion euros between 2019 and 2025 
on its nuclear deterrence strategy 
alone – a commitment that is likely to 
grow after 2030 to develop new tech-
nologies such as hypersonic systems.
So far, the response in Germany and 
the rest of Europe to Macron’s call for 
a strategic dialogue has been limit-
ed. In fact, since the bold nuclear pol-
icy speech given by former French 
Prime Minister Alain Juppé in Sep-
tember 1995, in which France of-
fered to discuss “concerted nuclear 
deterrence” with its European part-
ners, France and Germany have on-
ly talked past each other on these is-
sues. Meanwhile, France has made 
considerably more progress with the 
United Kingdom. At a summit in Oc-
tober 1995, the two countries recog-
nized that their vital security interests 
are inextricably linked. The Lancaster 
House Agreements of November 2010 
further formalized aspects of their co-
operation on defense. Although it was 
certainly easier for two partners of 
fairly even military capacity to start a 
constructive dialogue, the positive 
results of these talks should not be 
taken for granted given their histor-
ic rivalry, as well as their different tra-
ditions and varying degrees of attach-
ment to the transatlantic alliance.
It would be a pity if the long-stand-
ing Franco-German dialogue de sourd 
(“dialogue of the deaf”) would continue 
for another generation. President 
Macron’s offer to work with Germany 
might be imperfect in many ways, 
but it must kick-start a real political 
debate inside Germany. Roderich 
Kiesewetter, a Christian Democrat and 
the German parliament’s foreign policy 
spokesman, has already suggested that 
the Franco-British pact could form the 
foundation of a European nuclear de-
terrence strategy to be financed out 
of a joint European military budget. 
Rainer Arnold, a Social Democrat and 
the Bundestag’s spokesman on de-
fense, rebuffed Macron’s proposal, 
suggesting it would amount to a weak-
ening of NATO that would be unac-
ceptable to the United States. While 
Johann Wadephul, deputy chairman of 
the parliamentary representatives of 
the CDU/CSU group, suggested that 
a nuclear strategy for Europe could be 
agreeable if placed entirely under the 
command of NATO, German Defense 
Minister Annegret Kramp-Karrenbauer 
struck a more conservative line, in-
dicating limited interest for anything 
beyond NATO. Germany’s Greens 
continue to endorse global nuclear 
disarmament as a matter of principle 
and, consequently, have been reluctant 
to engage more actively on these geo-
strategic matters.
In its current form, Macron’s offer is un-
likely to change such mixed responses. 
Still, it should be used as an opportunity 
for the next generation of German lead-
ers to start a dialogue, first within Ger-
many and then with France. Although 
these discussions promise to be difficult 
and protracted – as were those around 
the creation of a single currency, for ex-
ample – they are unavoidable. These 
discussions should lead to a coherent 
and consistent German position. If Ger-
many rejects the principle of nuclear 
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A QUICK HISTORY OF THE 
NUCLEAR POLICY SPEECHES 
OF FRENCH PRESIDENTS
1994: President Francois Mitterand reveals the approx-
imate number of French nuclear warheads for the first 
time (less than 500). He also expresses openness to 
extending the definition of France’s vital interests to Eu-
rope, but he puts the onus on its European neighbors to 
open the debate on European political integration: “Que 
l’Europe se dote de notions claires en matière d’intérêt 
vital commun, qu’elle aille assez loin dans sa conscience 
politique pour estimer que l’intégrité territoriale des 
uns engage l’intégrité territoriale des autres, bref que 
d’immenses efforts et progrès soient accomplis par ceux 
qui entendent poursuivre la construction de l’Europe, et la 
France acceptera le débat.”
1995: Alain Juppé, French Prime Minster under President 
Jacques Chirac, gives an important speech in the context 
of France resuming nuclear weapons testing. For the first 
time Juppé offers to discuss concerted nuclear deterrence 
(“sur la dissuasion nucléaire concertée”). The move is made 
not only to secure backing from the UK and Germany 
for French nuclear tests, but also to start a real dialogue 
about the possible Europeanization of nuclear deterrence. 
1995: The agreement signed by both France and the UK in 
October is an opportunity for French President Jacques 
Chirac and British Prime Minister John Major to agree 
that “they do not see situations arising in which the vital 
interests of either Party could be threatened without the 
vital interests of the other also being threatened,” thus 
establishing the foundation for Franco-British nuclear 
cooperation and a possible model for its extension.
2001: Jacques Chirac gives the impression of upgrading 
the level of nuclear threat by referring to grossly unac-
ceptable damage (“dommages absolument inacceptables”) 
rather than simply unacceptable damage (“dommages 
inacceptables”). Later, this was revealed to have been a 
verbal slip. Chirac also affirms the contribution to Euro-
pean security made by French deterrence: “La dissuasion 
nucléaire doit aussi, c’est le vœu de la France, contribuer à 
la sécurité de l’Europe.”
2008: President Nicolas Sarkozy takes a more affirmative 
line, stating that French nuclear deterrence does include 
a European dimension and it welcomes a dialogue on the 
role of nuclear deterrence in Europe’s security: “S’agissant 
de l’Europe, c’est un fait, les forces nucléaires françaises, 
par leur seule existence, sont un élément clé de sa 
sécurité. Un agresseur qui songerait à mettre en cause 
l’Europe doit en être conscient. Je propose d’engager avec 
ceux de nos partenaires européens qui le souhaiteraient, 
un dialogue ouvert sur le rôle de la dissuasion et sa 
contribution à notre sécurité commune.”
2015: President Francois Hollande announces the reduc-
tion of warheads to 300, but he more precisely defines 
the focus of nuclear targets to include economic and 
political hubs, thereby stepping away from the traditional 
threat to inflict inacceptable damages. He also clarifies 
the definition of France’s vital interest to include not only 
territorial integrity but also safeguarding its population, 
which somewhat extends the threats that could be the 
object of nuclear reaction. Hollande also chooses the 
interrogative form to make a step in the direction of 
considering Europe’s territory as a whole to be a part of 
France’s vital interest: “Qui pourrait donc croire qu’une 
agression, qui mettrait en cause la survie de l’Europe, 
n’aurait aucune conséquence?”
2019: Emmanuel Macron confirms France’s arm’s-length 
relationship with NATO on nuclear matters (France does 
not and will not take part in NATO’s nuclear exercises), 
but he opens the door to a strategic dialogue in order 
to build a common strategic culture with European 
partners. Macron, however, falls short of offering a 
path to a common deterrence policy and does not refer 
to “concerted deterrence,” which would entail shared 
governance. In fact, he stresses that France’s ability to 
make independent decisions is compatible with France’s 
solidarity to Europe: “Par ailleurs, nos forces nucléaires 
jouent un rôle dissuasif propre, notamment en Europe. 
Elles renforcent la sécurité de l’Europe par leur existence 
même et à cet égard ont une dimension authentiquement 
européenne. Sur ce point, notre indépendance de décision 
est pleinement compatible avec une solidarité inébran-
lable à l’égard de nos partenaires européens. (…) Soyons 
clairs : les intérêts vitaux de la France ont désormais une 
dimension européenne. Dans cet esprit, je souhaite que se 
développe un dialogue stratégique avec nos partenaires 
européens qui y sont prêts sur le rôle de la dissuasion 
nucléaire française dans notre sécurité collective. Les 
partenaires européens qui souhaitent s’engager sur cette 
voie pourront être associés aux exercices des forces 
françaises de dissuasion.”
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deterrence outright, it should sign 
and ratify the TPNW as Ireland and 
Austria did. If, however, Germany 
accepts the principle of nuclear de-
terrence in the context of NATO and 
the US security guarantee, as it does 
today, it is not clear why it would reject 
an autonomous European deterrence 
strategy. If Germany accepts an au-
tonomous strategy in principle, France 
and Germany would in effect agree that 
their respective territorial integrity – 
and populations – are part of each oth-
er’s vital interests, as the UK and France 
did in their landmark agreement of 1995 
mentioned above. Such a step would 
mark a quantum leap in the conver-
gence of France and Germany’s security 
interests, which would force both coun-
tries to identify common threats and 
pave the way to greater cooperation.
Subsequently, Germany would need 
to decide if it simply wants France to 
de facto extend its nuclear umbrella 
to Germany or whether it wants to 
gradually establish a concerted nuclear 
doctrine, strategy, command, and 
force shared between the two coun-
tries. At the end of this important con-
versation within Germany, which will 
certainly be followed by long nego-
tiations with France, the two coun-
tries (with or without the UK) could 
be jointly responsible for Europe’s se-
curity policy and together command 
a unified European nuclear deter-
rence force – although such cooper-
ation could pose legal challenges vis-
à-vis the Non-Proliferation Treaty 
that both France and Germany have 
signed. France and Germany could 
then also share a common seat at the 
UN Security Council, if the Security 
Council has not been reformed by that 
time to offer a seat to Germany. 
These are ambitious proposals. Some, 
in fact, are taboo in France; others in 
Germany. Still, there will be no real 
strategic dialogue to speak of if both 
France and Germany are not prepared 
to have a candid discussion about their 
respective sacred cows and taboos.
